A set o f new power indices is introduced extending Banzhaf power index and allowing us to take into account agents' preferences to coalesce. An axiomatic characterization of intensity functions representing a desire of agents to coalesce is given. A set of axioms for new power indices is presented and discussed. An example of use of these indices for Russian parliament is given.
Introduction
Power indices have become a very powerful instrument for study of electoral bodies and an institutional balance of power in these bodies [5] [6] [7] [8] 11] .
One of the main shortcomings mentioned almost in all publications on power indices is the fact that known indices do not take into account the preferences of agents [6, 10] .
Indeed, in construction of those indices, e.g., Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf power indices [4, 12] , all agents are assumed to be able to coalesce. Moreover, none of those indices evaluates to which extent the agents are free in their wishes to create coalition, how intensive are the connections inside one or another coalition.
Consider an example. Let three parties A, B and C with 50, 49 and 1 sets, respectively, are presented in a parliament, and the voting rule is simple majority, i.e., 51 votes for.
Then winning coalitions are A+B, A+C, A+B+C and A is pivotal in all coalitions, B is pivotal in the first coalition and C is pivotal in the second one. Banzhaf power index ß for these parties is equal to b is the number of winning coalitions in which agent i is pivotal, i.e., if agent i expels from the coalition it becomes a loosing one [4] .
We introduce here two new types of indices based on the idea similar to Banzhaf power index, however, taking into account agents' preferences to coalesce.
In the first type the information is used about agents' preferences over other agents.
These preferences are assumed to be linear orders. Since these preferences may not be symmetric, the desire of agent 1 to coalesce with agent 2 can be different than the desire of agent 2 to coalesce with agent 1. These indices take into account in a different way such asymmetry of preferences.
In the second type of power index the information about the intensity of preferences is taken into account as well, i.e., we extend the former type of power index to cardinal information about agents' preferences.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives main notions. In Section 3 we define and discuss `ordinal' power indices. In Section 4 cardinal indices are introduced. In All these help and support are gratefully acknowledged
Main notions
The set of agents is denoted as N,
We consider the situation when the decision of a body is made by voting procedure; agents who do not vote `yes' vote against it, i.e., the abstention is not allowed.
Each agent has a predefined number of votes,
. It is assumed that a quota q is predetermined and as a decision making rule the voting with quota is used, i.e., the decision is made if the number of votes for it is not less than q, 
Sometime, one additional condition is applied as well 
Since i P is a linear order, the rank ij p of the agent j in i P can be defined. We assume that
The value ij p shows how many agents less preferable than j are in i P . For instance, if
N={A,B,C,D} and
, then 
It is worth emphasizing here that the intensities d) -f) do not depend on agent i, i.e., for any agent i in the following calculation of power indices we will assume that for any i in the coalition ω the corresponding intensity is the same.
Consider now several examples.
preference profiles given in Tables 1 and 2 . Let us calculate the functions f as above for each agent in each winning coalition.
The preferences from Tables 1 and 2 Now, for the profile given in Table 1 one can calculate the values of intensities a)-f) obtained by each agent i in each winning coalition ω . These values for the first preference profile is given in Table 3 and for the second one -in Table 4 . The indices ) (i α will be denoted as ) ( , ), ( 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 Table 3 for all i and ω is equal to 9/2. However,
The values of the indices 1 α -6 α for both preference profiles are given in Table 5 as
well as the values of Banzhaf index β
Consider now another example.
Example 2. Let N={A, B, C, D, E }, each agent has one vote, q=3 and the preferences
of agents are given in Table 6 .
The values of indices 2 α -4 α are given in Table 7 .
Note that 1 α is equal to the Banzahalf index, which for this case gives
First profile (Table 1) Second profile ( 
Cardinal indices
Assume now that the desire of party i to coalesce with party j is given as real number
One can call the value ij p as an intensity of connection of i with j. It may be interpreted as, for instance, a probability for i to form a coalition with j.
We define now several intensity functions a) average intensity of i is connection with other members of coalition ω Example 4. Let N={A,B,C,D}, each voter has only one vote, the quota is equal to q=3, and the matrix ij p is given in Table 8 . In Table 9 Table 9 . Some cardinal indices for Example 3
Evaluation for Russian Parliament
We will study now a distribution of power among factions in the third Russian Parliament (1999-2003) using these new indices.
The matrix ij p is constructed using the consistency index; the latter (the index of consistency of positions of two groups) is constructed as
where 1 q and 2 q be the share of "ay" votes in two groups of MPs [1] .
We consider the value of consistency index as the value of intensity of connections between agents i and j. Then we are in cardinal framework, and one can use one of the indices introduced in the previous section.
On Fig. 1 the values of 
Axiomatic construction of a cardinal intensity function
Now we will try to axiomatize a construction of cardinal intensity function.
First, we define an intensity function depending on intensities ij p of connections of i with other members of coalition ω , i.e., if
As it is seen, the intensity function for i depends not only of i's connections with other members of coalition, but depends also of connections of other members among themselves.
However, we will restrict this function in a way which is similar to independence of irrelevant alternatives [3] :
will depend on connections of agent i with other members of coalition ω only, i.e., ). , , ( )
Axioms for power indices
We introduce several axioms, which any reasonable power index should satisfy to.
First, we call a voting situation a four-tuple
, where N is a set of agents,
is a set of votes which agents possess, P r is a preference profile, where each agent N i ∈ has a preference (linear order) i P over } { \ i N or preference matrix ij p .
Axiom 1.
Under a given quota rule for any agent N i ∈ there exists an intensity profile
In words, for no agent it is known in advance, independently of agents' preferences, that her power is equal to 0.
Axiom 2 . Consider two voting situations
Assume that for a given distribution of votes and a given preference profile we evaluate power distribution among agents. Then we increase the number of votes for a given agent A, keeping the votes of other agents as before. Then Axiom 2 states that voting power of A in new situation should be not less than before.
Axiom 3.
(Symmetry) Let η be a one-to-one correspondence of N to N. Then
Axiom 3 states that power of agents does not depend of their names, i.e., the procedure of evaluation of power distribution must treat agents in a similar way.
Axiom 4.
Let N i ∈ be pivotal in no winning coalition ω . Then
It is usual axiom in voting power models (in fact, in game -theoretic models -see [12] ): a dummy player has power equal 1 to 0. 
This axiom can be explained in a simple way: all preferences except i's are the same in two profiles; in i'th preference the evaluation of j is higher in new profile than in the old one. Then the power of j should not be less in new voting situation (with ' P ). In words, let power of i is not less than the power of j with respect to first voting situation. Let ' P is such that for any agent but l new preferences of agents coincide with old preferences, and in l's preference the relative position of i with respect to j is higher in It is possible to formulate axioms similar to those from Section 5 and prove the theorem similar to the given above but for α -indices. However, it will be interesting to analize how the axioms from this Section provide an axiomatic characterization of α ind ices. 
